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Strategic Foresight and Porter’s Five Forces

Towards a Synthesis

Studienarbeit 2009 53 Seiten

BWL - Unternehmensführung, Management, Organisation

Leseprobe

Contents

Index of figures

List of abbreviations

1. Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 Research Gap
1.3 Structure of the Thesis

2. Results from the Literature Review
2.1 Evolution of Strategic Foresight
2.2 Components within Strategic Foresight
2.3 Strategic Foresight Methods
2.4 Role of Information
2.5 Process of Strategic Foresight

3. Conceptual Approach for Systemizing Porter’s Five Forces
3.1 Strategic Alignment via Porter
3.2 Porter’s Five Forces
3.3 Strategic Foresight and Porter’s Five Forces - A Synthesis

4. Management of Complexity according to Strategic Foresight
4.1 Theoretical Basics of Complexity
4.2 Models of Complexity
4.3 Applied Model of Complexity and Strategic Foresight - A Synthesis

5. Conclusion and Further Research

Appendix

References

Index of figures

Figure 1: Evolution of Strategic Foresight

Figure 2: Components of Strategic Foresight

Figure 3: Qualitative & quantitative methods according to the time horizon

Figure 4: Methods of Strategic Foresight

Figure 5: Selection of assessment forms and methods

Figure 6: Information sources & actors

Figure 7: Hammer's Strategic Foresight Process

Figure 8: Hine's Strategic Foresight Process

Figure 9: Horton's Strategic Foresight Process

Figure 10: Reger's, Rohrbeck's & Gemünden's Strategic Foresight Process

Figure 11: Formulation of Competitve Strategies

Figure 12: Porter's Five Forces

Figure 13: Synthesis of Strategic Foresight and Porter's Five Forces

Figure 14: Organizational Complexity

Figure 15: Environmental Complexity

Figure 16: Synthesis of Strategic Foresight, Porter’s Five Forces, and Complexity

List of abbreviations

illustration not visible in this excerpt

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In the 1960s and early 1970s Royal Dutch Shell and the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) developed several scenarios that addressed the risk of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sparking an oil crisis and ways in which such a crisis might be handeled. Based on the findings no dispositions have been made by Shell’s management with adapting behavior.1 In October 1973 the oil-exporting countries slowed their delivery rates hugely. This resulted in a price explosion from nearly three Dollars to twelve; almost 400 percentages Dollars.2 This caused a lot of suffering in industrial countries. None of the major oil companies, apart from Shell, was prepared for the oil price shock - “life as they knew it was changed forever”3. Shell’s management was able to respond quickly and, over the next few years, they moved from one of the smallest of the seven major oil companies to the second in size and the first in profitability.4 The oil shock is considered to be the moment that gave birth to the era of foresight in strategy.5

Due to Shell’s improved competitive position, other corporations started to focus to the relevance of strategic adjustments.6 For the first time, they paid attention to the future in a strategic manner and the acceleration affects their ambitions more than ever. Performance- related information and improved communication systems enhanced the market’s globalization, causing increased competition.7 Deregulation and liberalization compounded this trend.8 However, science and technology boosted the development of innovations at previously unknown speeds, with decreasing product lifecycles and increasing development times.9 To ensure success in the competitive marketplace, companies had to continuously develop and launch new products.10 Thus, the time frame for strategic and technological development had to become long-term oriented.11 Intensifying factors in the early 70s were for example increasing influence of society and politics, international competition, and shortage of resources.12

In the past, corporate strategy was mostly internally oriented, based on positioning the corporation according to its strength and weaknesses. True strategy, however, deals with the longer-term position of the organization in a future environment.13 Porter’s article, “What is Strategy”, emphasizes the long-term approach. He argues that being better than the competitors in terms of efficiency and cost saving is not enough to succeed. It is essential to create a unique and valuable position and to be different from other companies in terms of what benefits the customer. To achieve this goal of doing things differently from the way rivals do, the whole environment must been taken into account. This includes customers, competitors, products, and innovations.14 As the market shifted from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market, the firms recognized that, contrary to what they had previously assumed, they are not so independent from the environment.15 Therefore, they had to adjust their strategic activities in a systematic and continuous way with regard to environmental development.16 For example, in large companies, the management realized that technology cannot be considered as an isolated issue. In fact, a successful strategy will involve markets, society, politics and the customers.17 Young industries in particular are characterized by high uncertainty and a lack of the ability to formulate forward-looking strategies.18 Changes within the environment and the company become increading complex, novel, and discontinuous in comparison to past experience.19 Since there was a large increase in dynamic processes and globalization, the companies realized the importance of faster interactions between their businesses. Complexity of markets and the unsecure consequences of globalization encourage the desire for long-term- thinking. “Foresight” in strategy became more and more important.20

1.2 Research Gap

Strategic Foresight is a relatively young field of research. Although, plenty of different definitions, recommended methods or process approaches exist. Based on a literature review, this thesis tries to systemize the literature to shed light onto the current state of research.

Strategic Foresight, as a part of the strategic management, should be strongly related to one of the basic models of strategic management. The targeted object will be building a bridge to one of the most popular and practical models invented by Porter. Still today, there are no approaches that combine Porter’s Five Forces with Strategic Foresight.

In the literature, often the impact of complexity and dynamics is discussed in regard to Strategic Foresight, but a certain model to evaluate and measure complexity does not exist yet. Neither organizational nor environmental complexity has been included in current Strategic Foresight literature. After analyzing, systemizing, defining, and merging both models by dint of Strategic Foresight considerations, the development of a complexity model will accomplish the attempt to provide a holistic approach to measure complexity in regard to Strategic Foresight for further research.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

Based on a literature review, the journals and literature dealing with Strategic Foresight will be analyzed and systemized. The results will be presented in chapter 2 allocating the current state of research. In the first instance, chapter 2.1 illustrates the development of Strategic Foresight and different definitions that give a preliminary impression of the concerned issue. Chapter 2.2 defines and explains components of Strategic Foresight and its intention within the concepts. Predominantly based on practical experience, chapter 2.3 categorized the methods used within Strategic Foresight. Subsequently, chapter 2.4 describes the role of data, information and knowledge detected by literature review. Accomplishing the literature review, chapter 2.5 presents examples of certain process approaches within the Strategic Foresight research.

After a completion of the literature review, chapter 3 refers to one of the most widespread and fundamental strategic models in theory and practice: Porter’s Five Forces. Thus, chapter 3.1 illustrates basic issues of Porter’s approach, leading to chapter 3.2 that provides more detailed explanation of the Five Forces. Thirdly, chapter 3.3 deals with the attempt to systemize elements of Strategic Foresight by means of Porter’s Five Forces that shape industry competition, and merging the two approaches focusing on a Strategic Foresight context.

The second theoretical concept discussed in the thesis will be the Management of Complexity. Due to systemizing and defining Strategic Foresight issues via Porter, the next step will be to develop a model for measuring complexity. To prepare for further progress related to this assignment, chapter 4.1 provides a theoretical fundament regarding the Management of Complexity. In chapter 4.2, two certain models for managing organizational and environmental complexity will be presented for the settlement of Strategic Foresight claims. Thirdly, chapter 4.3 merges the models of complexity with the foregoing synthesis based on Porter and Strategic Foresight.

Finally, chapter 5 contains the conclusion and recommendations for further research.

2. Results from the Literature Review

The subsequent chapter sheds light on selected parts of Strategic Foresight research based on the literature review. Examined topics include the evolution of Strategic Foresight. Moreover, components, methods, the role of information, as well as the process of Strategic Foresight will be presented. Selectivity between the titles could not be guaranteed all the time. Especially the “overall process” includes other topics such as methods or the role of information. To cope with the huge amount of literature in regard to the previously named contents, separate chapters are necessary.

2.1 Evolution of Strategic Foresight

To understand the origin of Strategic Foresight, first we have to take a look at its history. Starting in the early seventies, Strategic Foresight was founded when “researchers began to look at the process of management and strategy development rather than the content.”21 The current science discusses two preceding generations, resulting with a third generation: Strategic Foresight.

According to Krystek / Müller-Stewens the first generation of early warning systems took place in the sixties in the English language area and during the early seventies in the German- speaking science.22 On the one hand side the early warning systems were based on business ratios and on the other hand on extrapolations.23 The business ratio oriented warning systems were related to the internal and external accounting within the company. The early identification of threats was the proper objective.24 Additionally, structurering the warning systems led to the advancement for short-term corporate planning. Performance figures in particular got more attention, supported by computer-based applications focusing on planning and control.25 Simultaneously, extrapolations became more important to generate comparisons of planned and actual data for validating and receiving information concerning early warning.26

The second generation was not only responsible for searching possible threats, but also for the active scanning of the internal and external environment for potential opportunities. During the first generation, the early warning system matters with the control and planning issues, as well as identifying threats. In comparison, the second one focused on an early detection system to interpret, analyze and systemize problems.27 Realized with a model founded on indicators to permit an early detection of internal (e.g., financial and non-financial) and external (e.g., macroeconomic and industry-sector-specific) factors for the corporation.28 A permanent and straightened analysis in certain topics was aspired and if a thread were detected, the information was reported to decision makers directly.29 Hence, the second generation focused on an active search for data to identify threads and opportunities for the own corporation or for marketpartner`s (costumers, suppliers, or competitors), and to construct a long-term information basis for the company. Considering the desire of the corporations to be prepared for the increasing trend of appearing crisis, a necessary step.30 Thus, Hahn / Krystek used the terminology “preventative crisis management”.31

The terms early warning systems, as well early detection system were known in other disciplines, like biology, geology, medicine, and in the military.32 For the first two generations operational usage for early warning and detection systems was common, but in the late seventies the corporations started concentrating on more strategic alignments open out into the third generation.33 Complexity of markets, dynamic processes, as well as uncertainty of globalization encouraged the desire for a long-term perspective and making executives aware of unknown opportunities and threats.34 With its roots in 1976, the article of Ansoff „ Managing Surprise and Discontinuity - Strategic Response to Weak Signals “ built the theoretical fundament for the third generation. His work postulates that discontinuities could be perceived by “weak signals” and if companies are prepared for strategic discontinuities, they are able to identify their developments to be armed for it.35 "Political and economic fog of uncertainty"36 makes it necessary to prepare the company and to reduce the response time to weak signals.37

Based on his work the third generation so called “Strategic Foresight” was created. To identify weak signals and to be prepared for discontinuities, the turbulent environment has to be observed.38 Focusing on the systematic gathering of strategic information to make them available for the management characterizes this generation.39 Due to the fact, that a strategic line of vision should be a part of the third generation, Krystek / Müller-Stewens determined that Strategic Foresight is performance oriented and connected to strategic management.40 In general, warning systems should be treated like “strategic radars”.41

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Figure 1: Evolution of Strategic Foresight42

Now that the characteristics of the third generation have been examined, the definition of Strategic Foresight has to be clarified. In scientific fields many definitions and terms are mentioned. In the literature Strategic Foresight equals the terms “Strategic Early Awareness, Strategic Issue Management, Environmental Scanning, or Business Intelligence“.43 In German linguistic usage the terms early warning, detection and foresight are often used synonymously.44 But only the third generation includes strategic components to identify threats and opportunities to be prepared and capable of enforcing reaction strategies. Information systems, enriched with information about new markets, products, technologies, laws, and so on, support the process.45 This process of information accumulation is realized by using methods to analyze, asses and evaluate them.46 Strategic Foresight represents a “Sign of Time” to be “the answer of a turbulent and complex environment”.47 Following Lichtenthaler, Strategic Foresight is a process for the strategic generation of knowledge to enable action.48 Bea / Haas used the term “Management of Discontinuities” which equals Strategic Foresight.49 To their mind Strategic Foresight should be responsible for early recognition, treatment and completion of discontinuities.50 According to Müller-Stewens / Lechner Strategic Foresight supports the corporation to be flexible and able to adapt to environmental conditions with the aim to be more sensitive concerning changes.51 Nick regards to the micro and macro environment, where Strategic Foresight is targeting the identification and management of strategic environmental change to support the decision makers.52 Foresight takes environmental development into account for the corporation’s development to locate alternative future events.53 Slaughter focuses on a future-view, while defining Strategic Foresight as the “ability to create and maintain a high quality, coherent and functional forward view, and to use the insights arising in useful organizational ways”.54

Due to the fact, that Strategic Foresight is a relatively young discipline, plenty of definitions and terms exist. However, most approaches are focusing on the same issues, thus intersections and differences have been pointed out. Furthermore, concerning to the historical development and the relation to operating figures of the three generations early warning systems, early detection systems, and Strategic Foresight exist more clarity.

2.2 Components within Strategic Foresight

The field of interest within the Strategic Foresight approach is classified in the economical, social, political and technological environment of the corporation identifying new markets, products or technologies.55 The different areas are congruent with the four foresight or intelligence approaches Competitive Intelligence, Consumer Foresight, Political Environment Foresight and Technology Intelligence.56 The roots of “Intelligence” came from the military reconnaissance focused on information gathering concerning competitors or enemies, respectively.57 “Foresight” is defined through the Oxford Dictionary as “the ability to see future needs” and to “care in preparing for these”.58

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Figure 2: Components of Strategic Foresight59

Competitive Intelligence is based on Porter ’s model of Competitive Strategy defined as “focusing on the external competitive environment and considers information sources and how companies collect information for strategic decision making.“60 The information gathering refers to current and to future activities.61 Thus, it is essential for generating competitive advantages with an early adaption of corporate strategy.62 Kahaner and Baars / Kemper emanates from an ethical, systematic and continuous approach for observation, preparation and analysis concerning competitors and industries.63 Choo defines the Competitive Intelligence as an „analytical process that transforms disaggregated competitor, industry, and market data into actionable strategic knowledge about the competitive capabilities, intentions, performance, and position”.64

The second component, Consumer Foresight, uses methods and techniques for the early identification, collection, assessment and anticipation of consumer related information like current/future customer needs and requirements, as well as socio-cultural backgrounds.65 To be customer oriented and meeting their needs, fostered by marketing and R&D during the new product development, is an important factor for increasing innovation success, thus market success.66 Incorporating feedback leads to incremental innovations and meeting future needs to radical one.67 Therefore, caring for future needs helps evaluating customer behavior a priori and the way socio-cultural influences, like shifting values and lifestyle issues, foster it.68

Political Environment Foresight implies the identification, evaluation and the usage of changing environmental conditions by focusing on politics. Especially in highly regulated industries like telecommunications, the Political Environment Foresight plays a huge role in development, influenced by lobbyists. International acting companies take shifts in politics and legislation into account to plan their strategic adjustment and to identify innovation needs.69

In the literature there are several terms that are used synonymously. Instead of the term Technology Intelligence, technical intelligence, science intelligence or technology foresight are used. Technology foresight is often substituted with more commonly notations like technology monitoring, technology scouting, technology forecasting, technology watch, or technology evaluation.70 Conclusively, all the different terms describe specific parts of the technical oriented process. In my paper I will use the term Technology Intelligence.

Technology Intelligence is considered as differentiation of Strategic Foresight with the achievement potential technology.71 Technology Intelligence is a continuous process for structuring, assessment, preparation, treatment and evaluation of parameters concerning to technological development, as well as identifying (technology scanning) weak signals and observing (technology monitoring) the environment to build an information basis.72 Gathering, assessing and communication of external information with reference to technological change and weak signals is known as technology scanning.73 Technological monitoring is an observation of science or technology, based on international events or certain activities of organizations in related topics and will be activated if relevant information are identified during the scanning process.74 Additionally, this process involves not only technological issues but also economic and social parameters to support strategic decision-making to balance the rigidity concerning future trends.75 Technology Intelligence is targeting a duly supply of strategic information according to technological trends in the environment to generate (technical) opportunities and prepare for (technical) surprises.76 Furthermore, Technology Intelligence shall enhance current businesses with technological improvement, generation of new technological knowledge to enter new markets, recognition of discontinuities, and emerging technologies.77 It is “perceived as being directly useful and necessary for strategic formulation”.78

Conclusively, depending on the country and the doctrine many different terms and definitions within the components exist. However, in the literature Technology Intelligence and Competitive Intelligence are mostly analyzed and discussed. The transitions between all four components are blurred and cannot be completely selective.

2.3 Strategic Foresight Methods

The dedication of selected methods for analyzing the environment and preparing for the future is the core element within Strategic Foresight.79 In literature exist a huge amount of different methods and tools dealing with extracting relevant information to generate competitive advantages.80 Methods have been developed, evaluated, selected, adapted and combined and were used to meet the requirements of the corporations.81 The usage of them shall support innovation and technology management to improve performance.82 But the real challenge is to choose an appropriate method for the specific needs, hindered by reason that complex methods are less known inside the firms.83 Resulting of the literature analysis, different authors mentioned and categorized plenty of methods, e.g. Burmeister, et al. (2002), (2004), Bircher (1976), Bürgel, et al. (2005), Porter, et al. (2003), Lichtenthaler (2002), (2004b), (2005), and Reger (2001). Based on empirical studies most important foresight-methods are scenario technique, trend- and environment analysis, interviews with experts, Delphi method, and creativity methods, as well as technology roadmaps, market and competitor analysis.84

Burmeister, et al. clustered methods with statistical support in regard to their operational area, like strategic development and planning, planning processes, innovation management, corporate communication, and marketing.85 Due to their survey, in corporations most important methods are Brainstorming, Publication Analysis, Scenario Technique, Environmental and Trend Analysis, Technology-Portfolio-Analysis, as well as Expert Interviews.86 But they also postulate first the usage of qualitative methods before relying on quantitative methods, because business ratios are the “currency” of a corporation.87

Porter, et al. categorizes methods in “hard” (quantitative: empirical, numerical) or ‘‘soft’’ (qualitative: validated, reflecting informal knowledge), and whether it is normative (beginning the process with a perceived future need) or exploratory (beginning the process with extrapolation of current technological capabilities).88 In almost the same manner did Burmeister, et al.. They classified quantitative methods as standardized, particular, and presence related aiming a prediction of the future. Qualitative methods are not well standardized, open, flexible, holistic, and process-oriented aiming an understanding of coherence.89 Similar, Bircher distinguished in quantitative (e.g., regression and life-cycle- analysis) and qualitative (e.g., Delphi and scenario) methods.90

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Figure 3: Qualitative & quantitative methods according to the time horizon91

Concerning to the time horizon e.g., quality function deployment fits to short-term perspectives, roadmaps to medium-term and scenario technique is recommended for a longterm perspective.92 Porter recommends the scenario technique especially in young industries to create a vision for the future.93 But new methods are needed to take advantage of information resources and answering to complex systems.94

Rohrbeck, et al. classified Strategic Foresight methods into three areas. On the one hand they defined market-oriented methods for a better understanding and assessment of consumer needs. On the other hand technology-oriented methods are pointed out focusing on technological development.95 Lastly, they examined integrating methods to create an interface for overcoming barriers between the two foregoing categorizations. Examples are scenario technique, roadmaps and quality function deployment, as well as internal Delphi study.96

[...]


1 cf. Ansoff (1984), p. 329, Mietzner / Reger (2005), p. 222.

2 cf. Sill (2007), p. 22.

3 Barber (2006), p. 88.

4 cf. Mietzner / Reger (2005), p. 222.

5 cf. Nick (2008), p.1.

6 cf. Burmeister / Neef (2005), p. 15.

7 cf. Burmeister, et al. (2004), p. 7.

8 cf. Burmeister / Neef (2005), p. 15.

9 cf. Burmeister, et al. (2004), p. 7, Rohrbeck / Gemünden (2006), p. 159.

10 cf. Leenders / Wierenga (2002), p. 305.

11 cf. Burmeister, et al. (2004), p. 33.

12 cf. Hammer (1992), p. 34.

13 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 3, Whitehill (1996), pp. 249f.

14 cf. Porter (1996), pp. 68-75.

15 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 3.

16 cf. Burmeister / Neef (2005), p. 17, Hammer (1992), p. 195.

17 cf. Burmeister / Neef (2005), p. 18.

18 cf. Porter (1992), p. 295.

19 cf. Ansoff (1990), p. 11.

20 cf. Burmeister / Neef (2005), p. 17.

21 Whitehill (1996), p. 250.

22 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 19, Szyperski (1973), p. 25.

23 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 19, Rehkugler (2002), pp. 586f, Rafée / Wiedmann (1988), p. 2.

24 cf. Rehkugler (2002), p. 586.

25 cf. Hammer (1992), pp. 172f, Hahn / Klausmann (1986), pp. 265f.

26 cf. Hammer (1992), pp. 172f.

27 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), pp. 19f, Rafée / Wiedmann (1988), p. 4.

28 cf. Rehkugler (2002), pp. 587f.

29 cf. Hammer (1992), p. 173, Hahn / Klausmann (1986), p. 265.

30 cf. Krystek (1981), p. 57, Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 23.

31 Hahn / Krystek (1979), p. 43.

32 cf. Hahn / Krystek (1979), pp. 78f, Klausmann (1983), p. 40, Hammer (1992), p. 171.

33 cf. Hammer (1992), pp. 173f.

34 cf. Burmeister / Neef (2005), p. 17, Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 3, Mietzner / Reger (2007), p. 154.

35 cf. Ansoff (1976), pp. 129-152.

36 Ibid., p. 134.

37 cf. ibid., p. 142.

38 cf. Rehkugler (2002), p. 588.

39 cf. Hammer (1992), p. 174.

40 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 20.

41 Hahn (1983), p. 13.

42 Own figure based on Hammer (1992), pp. 172-174, Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 21, Rehkugler (2002), pp 586-588.

43 cf. Nick (2008), p. 22.

44 cf. Hammer (1992), p. 175, Lichtenthaler (2002), p.13.

45 cf. Hammer (1992), p. 184.

46 cf. Andersen, et al. (2004), p. 319, Coates (1985), p. 33, Cuhls (2003), p. 93.

47 Hammer (1992), p. 184.

48 cf. Lichtenthaler (2002), p. 12.

49 cf. Bea / Haas (2005), p. 306, Nick (2008), p. 16.

7

50 cf. Bea / Haas (2005), p. 306.

51 cf. Müller-Stewens / Lechner (2005), p. 206.

52 cf. Nick (2008), p. 19.

53 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 5.

54 Slaughter (1999), p. 218.

55 cf. Ansoff (1976), p. 139, Hammer (1992), p. 184, Ruff (2006), p. 281, Simon (1985), p. 25.

56 cf. Rohrbeck, et al. (2007), pp.4f, Rohrbeck / Gemünden (2006), pp. 160f.

57 cf. Fuld (1995), p. 23, Michaeli (2005), p.3, Müller (2008), p. 27.

58 Hornby (1980), p. 337.

59 Own figure based on Rohrbeck, et al. (2007), p. 4.

60 Porter (1980), p. 47.

61 cf. Bernhardt (1993), p. 13, Lichtenthaler (2002), p. 13.

62 cf. Ansoff / Mcdonnell (1990), p. 187, Kunze (2000), p. 64.

63 cf. Baars / Kemper, p. 10, Kahaner (1996), p. 19.

64 Choo (2002), p. 86.

9

65 cf. Rohrbeck, et al. (2007), p. 4, Brenner (1996), p. 20, Rohrbeck / Gemünden (2006), p. 160, Slater / Mohr (2006), p. 30, Trommsdorff / Steinhoff (2007), pp. 254f.

66 cf. Cooper (2006), p. 20, Henard / Szymanski (2001), p. 368, Leenders / Wierenga (2002), pp. 310f, Ruff (2006), p. 284, Slater / Mohr (2006), p. 30.

67 cf. Henderson (2006), p. 7.

68 cf. Rosenberg / Shoemaker (1980), p. 82, Ruff (2006), pp. 284f.

69 cf. Rohrbeck, et al. (2007), p. 4, Choo (1995), p. 134, Day / Schoemaker (2005), p. 136, Roll (2004), p. 59, Slaughter (1997), p. 13.

70 cf. Lichtenthaler (2002), p. 16, Reger (2001), p. 535.

71 cf. Bea / Haas (2005), p. 549, Lichtenthaler (2002), p.11, Nick (2008), p. 33.

72 cf. Rohrbeck, et al. (2007), p. 3, Ansoff (1976), p. 140, Gerybadze (1990), p. 72, Wolfrum (1994), p. 134.

73 cf. Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 175, Raymond, et al. (2001), p. 124.

74 cf. Ashton, et al. (1991), p. 95, Krystek / Müller-Stewens (1993), p. 175.

75 cf. Gerpott (1999), p. 101, Gerybadze (1990), p. 72, Porter, et al. (2003), p. 289, Wolfrum (1994), p. 134.

76 cf. Howell / Shea (2001), p. 16, Lichtenthaler (2004a), p. 56, Wolfrum (1994), p. 134.

77 cf. Reger (2006), p. 305.

78 Reger (2001), p. 537.

79 cf. Müller (2008), p. 52.

80 cf. Rohrbeck / Gemünden (2006), p. 163.

81 cf. Müller (2008), p. 52, Reger (2006), p. 318.

82 cf. Meyer (2002), p. 266, Phaal, et al. (2006), p. 336

83 Meyer (2002), p. 266.

84 cf. Burmeister, et al. (2002), p. 78, Burmeister, et al. (2004), p. 37, Bürger, et al. (2005), p.41.

85 cf. Burmeister, et al. (2002), p. 85.

86 cf. Burmeister (2002), pp. 78-81, Burmeister (2004), p. 38.

87 cf. Burmeister (2004), p. 38.

88 cf. Porter, et al (2003), p. 289.

89 cf. Burmeister (2002), p. 90.

90 cf. Bircher (1976), pp. 186f.

91 Based on Lichtenthaler (2002), p. 41, Lichtenthaler (2005), p. 398, Reger (2006), p. 320.

92 cf Lichtenthaler (2002), p. 41, Lichtenthaler (2005), p. 398.

93 cf. Porter (1992), p. 295.

94 cf. Porter, et al. (2003), p. 287.

95 cf. Rohrbeck / Gemünden (2006), p. 167.

96 cf. Rohrbeck, et al. (2007), p. 7, Rohrbeck / Gemünden (2006), pp. 167f.

Details

Seiten
53
Jahr
2009
ISBN (eBook)
9783640902477
ISBN (Buch)
9783640902583
Dateigröße
3.9 MB
Sprache
Englisch
Katalognummer
v171110
Institution / Hochschule
Technische Universität Berlin
Note
Schlagworte
Strategic Foresight Corprate Foresight Porter Porter's Five Forces Strategic Management Management of Complexity Technology Intelligence Consumer Foresight Competitive Intelligence Prozesskomplexität Marktdiversität Wettbewerbskomplexität Ressourcenkomplexität Diversität Ambiguität Ambiguity Interdependenz

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Titel: Strategic Foresight and Porter’s Five Forces