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Drug War Mexico

Hausarbeit 2012 23 Seiten

Politik - Internationale Politik - Region: Mittel- und Südamerika

Leseprobe

Content:

1. Introduction

2. The New War
2.1 Agents of violence and privatization of violence
2.2 Economy of violence and "third sector"
2.3 Violence beyond ideological motives paradigms
2.4 Violence Strategy

3. Organized crime as a player in a new war
3.1 Organized Crime against the State
3.2 Organized crime against Organized Crime

4. Mexican drug war - a new war
4.1 Actors
4.2 The "big business" of the Mexican drug trade
4.3 Causes of Violence
4.4 Within the cartels
4.5 Between cartels and the state
4.6 Brutality and Media Staging

5. Conclusion

Appendix:

Bibliography

1. Introduction

In August, the number of deaths caused by the so-called "Mexican drug war" has increased to over 7,000 in 2010. Thus, only in the first half of the entire previous year's level has been exceeded. Since President Calderón in 2006 declared the war to the cartels a total of more than 28,000 people died. [1] It is also notable that the number of soldiers, the military used to curb the pervasive violence in the domestic, are now exceeded to 50 000 soldiers.[2] The ratios of this magnitude are like those of conflicts, which political science recognize as "War". In addition to the purely numerical dimension, the Mexican Situation is characterized by a staging remarkable brutality and cruelty of torture, mutilation, staged execution and display of the dead in public particularly in the north of the country.

Due to this situation in July 2010 the U.S. government was forced to public a travel warning for the neighboring country. [3] The quantitatively and qualitatively, extraordinary violence, which occurs between the actors, raises the question of whether this situation can also be described as a "war". The presence of a "traditional" interstate conflict can be denied without further debate. Even the term of "civil war" seems premature, since the one hand, the government action itself want to be understood as a crime fighting in the narrow sense and the excessive violence between non-state actors on the other hand is an outflow of more radical market logic.

This illustrates the difficulty in the specific scientific handling of the Mexican problem. It opposing each other: the organized Drug trafficking, (cartels[4] ) in the form of numerous organizations competing fiercely and the Mexican government, which tries recover its monopoly on violence.

When attempting to categorize the situation in political science the use of the term "new war" is another concept of national wars, which seems to be appropriate to classify the empirical findings.

To answer the question whether the security situation in Mexico can be classified as a "new war" its distinctive features and characteristics will be presented in theoretical form. On the next level, it is argued that organized crime violence can be a new war actor himself and cannot be reduced to a supporting role to the economic. Based on the acquired theoretical knowledge an analysis of empirical findings follows. Here it is shown how the Realities of the Mexican conflict situation make the country into a theater of war in the sense of presented concept. Finally, the results are summarized in a conclusion and pointed to the possible implications of the finding of a new war.

2. The New War

At the end of the 1990s, an increasing number of intrastate conflicts could just insufficiently being recorded with conventional analysis methods. The "new war" was a concept thought that that detectable change in form of armed conflict should be made empirically. [5] This account was caused by fundamental changes in the opportunities of warfare.[6] Based on the considerations of Kaldor and Münker Monika Heupel formulated a list of characteristics, which demonstrate a new war. Differenced of the "classic" War variants (the war between states and the Civil War), the new war can be classified in relation to four significant peculiarities:[7] the agents of violence, the specific Economy, the motivations for the use of force and violence strategy.

2.1 Agents of violence and privatization of violence

With regard to the perpetrators of violence, a new war is typically characterized by an increasing privatization of the combatants. [8] This is meant in addition to the state with his claim for as violence monopolists, that other players will exert physical violence, while not following the set rules of the state to use force. In their place comes an actor's own entitled to use force, determining its scope mainly territorially.

In a new war, there is ideally a number of decentralized and autonomous active players who challenge the state and try to impose their private interests against the others with force.[9] In the privatization of the armed groups it is to distinguish between a form of privatization from the top as well as the privatization from the bottom. [10] The distinction made by Eppler proves to be quite valuable to explain the diversity of autonomous actors who are active in the war. Privatization of above said The delegation of state authority functions to private security firms or Paramilitary. Consequently, it includes the emancipation of regular troops from state control. The other variant of privatization appears at first glance not new. [11] Revolutionary and insurgents, by definition, have been trying since times to defy state monopoly through their own ideas and to modify or replace them entirely. Today privatized violence develops from society, but especially around so- called "warlords". This Leader of a war party represent prototypes of what in the subsequent analysis of economic violence and motives of violence is called a "war contractor". [12]

As it will be shown, these humans are an important link between "war" and "organized Crime", since they connect political, military and economic logic.[13]

Privatization of violence may continue to occur in response to a threat against which the State cannot protect its citizens in sufficient quantities.

If the loss of state monopoly in the perception of citizens is so evident that no security of State can expected, a violent actor can be developed within the community to exercising the sovereign power functions independently. Although the committed violence does not aim the state at the first glaze, it is an indicator of an advanced resolution of the state monopoly. In this way another private Actor beside the State develops, which exercises violence. [14]

2.2 Economy of violence and "third sector"

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Parallel to the described denationalization of security and the privatization of the armed groups another feature of the new wars develops: an economic framework that is described in literature as the "economy of violence" [15] This means that the financial provision of private armed groups is based on informalization and criminalization which causes the close between the subject of war and organized actors. The field of "open criminal economy" [16] is defined by Lock as the "third sector" [17] of a globalized war economy. In this sphere organized crime Violence is the primary means of regulation of economic and social relations of the individual Parties (individuals or groups). This concludes from the fact that in an economy that deals with illegal goods, a constitutional protection of any property is not ensured. Illegality and the associated pressure of persecution cause the price level and thus are the defining parameters for the volume of illicit financial trades. This refers especially to the drug-trade. In a new war an organized crime is a key success factor for the privatized violence. A privatized war party who's shadow economy has sufficient resources deductible will not have problems to ensure their supply. [19]

In this context an economic cooperation between a warlord and criminal service providers seems reasonable. The extreme version however, is the emergence of a so-called war contractor. This is entrepreneurial in two ways. The private actor violence is a) self-participants in the third sector (i.e., it operates in organized crime) and b) violence is understood as a necessary and relatively cheap Investment in achieving its goals. [20] A large number of privatized violence actors who are also operating in organized crime, could therefore lead to the commission of acts of violence on a scale that "surpasses some armed conflict, what the political science classify as a war’ [21] The economy of violence symptomatic is emphasized by a superior economic importance of the third sector for private violence-actors. They generate their funding through links with or direct participation in organized crime. Warlike violence and organized crime gear into each other. A major distinction between criminal organizations and the armed followers of a rebel leader is increasingly difficult. [22] With Lock one can summarize: "A general must be a successful entrepreneur, to be a successful General [23].

2.3 Violence beyond ideological motives paradigms

The mixing of the roles of actor and war (criminal) entrepreneurs is also reflected in the motives which lead to violence. As will be apparent, an interaction takes place here, since only a fundamentally changed in the situation of motives of the force users can arise the type of war entrepreneur. In a new war ideological war and / or identity-related violence are not the main motivations. The target of violence itself is liable of economization. [24]

This effects, that it cannot be distinguished unambiguously whether privatized armed groups operate "their dark business, so they can fund their potential for violence can or whether they just want to help out these deals with violence. " [25]

A strengthened economic motivation is closely related to the economy of violence and its associated Influence of organized crime. Their characteristic greed and profiteering, which also the actor of violence mades to his own cause, strengthen the formation of the typical war contractor. He uses violence as a means of regulation of markets, which doesn’t get protection of the state. and also - due to a number of privatized Violent actors with exactly the same selfish motivations - conflicts of interest likely to be. Are war contractors getting into fight with each other, or will their business be threatened by governmental actions, they feel compelled to defend their interests by force. This gives them an instrumental character, which manifests itself in the fact that violence is used instrumentally to enlarge their own material wealth, at least to defend its stock. [26]

2.4 Violence Strategy

The criterion of violence strategy is another one, in which the new War demarcates of previously known forms. Here a high degree of brutality, especially in the use of force, can be noticed. [27] Since the claim that violence in other forms of war is less brutal, a certain cynicism in itself, it must be specified in more detail here. Salient aspects are part of a brutal acts of violence as such, and secondly that they take place against civilians. [28] Massacres and other acts of violence, which seem more criminal than military authorities are no longer here just a mistake is in the battle, but well done consciously and with a clear goal. This can be seen in the fact that the private violence actor generates fear and a climate of fear to proof their own power and to strengthen his claim of violence.

[...]


[1] Der Spiegel: Land im Blutrausch <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,710009,00.html>,(opened: 06.01.2012, 16:18).

[2] Ibid.

[3] US Department of State (2010): Travel warning from 16. July 2010: <http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_4755.html>, (opened: 06.01.2012, 16:23).

[4] In the following, the term "cartel" is used to a smuggling ring with a specific territorial focus.

[5] Münkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, Hamburg: Rowohlt 2003, p. 131.

[6] Heupel, Monika/Zangl, Bernhard, Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel ' kriegerischer Gewalt, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Edition 45, p. 346.

[7] Ibid.p.349.

[8] Heupel, Monika/Zangl, Bernhard, Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel ' kriegerischer Gewalt, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Edition 45, p. 350..

[9] Eppler, Erhard,:Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt. Die Kommerzialisierung und Privatisierung der Gewalt., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2004, p.12.

[10] Ibid. p.30.

[11] Ibid, p. 30.

[12] Münkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, Hamburg: Rowohlt 2003, p. 13.

[13] Ibid. p. 161.

[14] Eppler, Erhard,:Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt. Die Kommerzialisierung und Privatisierung der Gewalt., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2004, p.53.

[15] Lock, Peter, Kriegsökonomien und Schattenglobalisierung, in: Ruf, Werner,Politische Ökonomie der Gewalt. Staatszerfall und die Privatisierung von Gewalt und Krieg., Opladen: Leske +Budrich, p.118.

[16] Münkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, Hamburg: Rowohlt 2003, p. 11..

[17] Lock, Peter, Ökonomie der neuen Kriege, in: LpBBW, Die neuen Kriege. Der Bürger im Staat, Edition: 4/2004, p. 192.

[18] Heupel, Monika/Zangl, Bernhard, Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel ' kriegerischer Gewalt, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Edition 45, p. 353.

[19] Eppler, Erhard,:Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt. Die Kommerzialisierung und Privatisierung der Gewalt., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2004, p.63.

[20] Chojnacki, Sven, Gewaltakteure und Gewaltmärkte. Wandel der Kriegsformen?, in: LpBBW, Der Bürger im Staat, Edition: Nr. 04/2004, p.. 197 - 205.

[21] Heupel, Monika/Zangl, Bernhard, Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel ' kriegerischer Gewalt, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Edition 45, p. 353. Ibid.

[22] Münkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, Hamburg: Rowohlt 2003, p. 11.

[23] Lock, Peter, Ökonomie der neuen Kriege, in: LpBBW, Die neuen Kriege. Der Bürger im Staat, Edition: 4/2004, p. 192.

[24] Heupel, Monika/Zangl, Bernhard, Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel kriegerischer Gewalt, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Edition 45, p. 353.

[25] Eppler, Erhard,:Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt. Die Kommerzialisierung und Privatisierung der Gewalt., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2004, p.63.

[26] Chojnacki, Sven, Gewaltakteure und Gewaltmärkte. Wandel der Kriegsformen?, in: LpBBW, Der Bürger im Staat, Edition: Nr. 04/2004, p.. 197 – 205.

[27] Heupel, Monika/Zangl, Bernhard, Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel´kriegerischer Gewalt, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Edition 45, p. 353.

[28] Ibid.

Details

Seiten
23
Jahr
2012
ISBN (eBook)
9783656202851
ISBN (Buch)
9783656207252
Dateigröße
646 KB
Sprache
Englisch
Katalognummer
v194852
Institution / Hochschule
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Note
1,3
Schlagworte
drug mexiko

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Titel: Drug War Mexico