There is, in modern society, a general trend of antipathy regarding morality, leading to an acceptance of unconsidered egocentric utilitarianism. This essay sets out to combat blind consequentialism in its most esteemed form, in favour of a considered approach, regardless of perspective. The outcome is a brief analysis of the concepts and arguments in one of the most prominent debates in ethics, providing a concise evaluation of the key tenets of both sides.
Contents
Abstract
Utilitarianism (for)
Situation Ethics (for)
sectionary conclusion (for)
Theological Voluntarism (against)
Kantianism (against)
Conclusion (for vs against)
Appendix
Bibliography/ References
Abstract
Consequentialism is the ethical theory that the moral value of an action may be determined by the sum of its outcomes. There are many forms of this theory, mainly differing on what the determinant of a ‘good’ outcome is, and many forms of opposition to it. These theoretical perspectives cannot be based on physical, empirically scrutable principles and so they are defensible only through meta-ethical philosophy, relying on logical arguments and fundamental assertions on which actions are good or bad. The most esteemed of these arguments will be the focus of this essay, in which I intend to outline and analyse the fundamental moral assertions and arguments of consequential theory and provide some answer to the question; ‘is Consequentialism an effective ethical theory?’
Supporting arguments, Part i- Utilitarianism
Arguably the most widely-held Consequentialist theory in the modern world is utilitarianism, this rests on the assumption that the good action is that which produces the most happiness for the most people. Utilitarianism is so-called because it relies on the ‘principle of social utility’ (An enquiry into the principles of morals, David Hume, 1777), whereby the action that produces the “greatest happiness for the greatest number” is the morally correct one to take. This can be known as a ‘hedonistic’ theory as it posits happiness (synonymous with pleasure) as the single most important product of any action and the end product by which goodness is determined. Utilitarianism is the view held by more people than, arguably, know what it is, this theory seems to be the consensus among peoples regardless of their awareness of its subtleties, implying a level of agree-ability or perhaps even natural occurrence.
‘Classical utilitarianism’ (The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Julia Driver, 2009) is the position held by those who follow the first formal proposal of utilitarianism, by Jeremy Bentham in The principles of morals and legislation in 1781. This is the quintessential utilitarian theory and relies on ‘moral economics’, whereby the positive and negative outcomes may be used to determine the overall NET morality of any decision, effectively making utilitarianism a quantifiable view of pleasures against pain. This theory can be expressed in the calculation [pleasures – pains = moral value]. Bentham’s position is completely quantitative in that it asserts that whatever benefits the majority is necessarily good as this satiates the larger portion of society’s desires, this means that any positive outcome will justify the means by which it is achieved. Bentham developed a system of classifications and calculations to describe the process of determining moral value, including the ‘hedonic calculus’ (fig. 1) – a series of considerations that determine whether an act will produce happiness/pleasure – and a categorisation of accountable pains and pleasures. Overall, Bentham noted 30 pains and pleasures that may be drawn from a situation and so attempted to place utilitarianism on a quantitative, empirical and quantitatively-motivated moral foundation.
However, this theory succumbs to the same problem that is ubiquitous in Consequentialism, namely that it depends on the outcomes, of which we have no knowledge. Thus it affords for the misattribution of moral value to a decision which, by the same moral system, not only be both right and wrong (a distinct violation of the law of non-contradiction), but would also provide no definitive ascription of value, as the action becomes right or wrong in regards to when we are judging it. This, the Objectivist may claim, leads the utilitarian to hold a contradictory view of morality that denigrates from the importance of moral considerations themselves (dimensions of moral theory: an introduction to meta-ethics and moral psychology, Jonathan Jacobs, 2002).
Another criticism is that Bentham’s theory relies on the concept of pleasure as a determining factor, yet this cannot be measured nor quantified, posing a fundamental contention between Bentham’s moral calculation and hedonism. Therefore, we see that utilitarianism is not compatible with its own principles, making its effectiveness as a moral theory questionable.
Furthermore, Bentham’s moral theory was heavily internally criticised by fellow utilitarian John Stuart Mill for its justification of minority mistreatment, as what suits the majority may require immoral treatment of the minority (Essay on Bentham, J.S Mill, 1838). This may be seen is such examples as the farming of an individual’s organs against their will, this is not moral behaviour yet it would be entirely justified by act utilitarianism if it resulted in the greatest provision of pleasure. Mill argued that because of this, Bentham’s utilitarianism was an unsuitable moral theory.
Mill’s discontent with the pluralistic approach was such that he responded by developing his own theory of utilitarianism, known as rule utilitarianism, this was a more hedonistic approach as it focused on qualitative pleasure as opposed to the more pluralistic method employed by act utilitarianism. This was mainly through invoking the harm principle, whereby an excessive amount of personal suffering may negate the goodness of an action, regardless of whether or not the principle of social utility is satisfied or not. Mill also considered laws to be of paramount importance in moral decision making, this is because they are devised to serve society and thus it is always better to act lawfully rather than unlawfully, but only where this does not conflict with the greatest pleasure. Another development by Mill was the principles of higher and lower pleasures; he differentiated between these as ‘pleasures of the body’ and ‘pleasures of the mind’ (Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, 1863). Mill claims that the pleasures of the mind were better than those of the body as they were more conducive to the betterment of society as a whole and represented the development of the civilised, moral part of a human and was a method of effectively transcending the animalistic desires of mankind.
Mill, however, agreed with Bentham that welfare could be determined through the same calculation of pleasure minus suffering, positing another economic moral theory. This is representative of his political philosophy and, in some senses, his general world view as seen in other works where Mill proposes equality as a route to ultimate morality (On the subjection of women, J.S Mill, 1869 / On liberty, J.S. Mill, 1859/ The Negro question, the Fraser magazine for town and country, J.S Mill, 1850 &c).
However, Mill’s own work has also been criticised widely, his assertions on what constitute a ‘higher’ pleasure are considered to be those of the high society of Victorian Britain and thus not a fair moral guideline. Furthermore, Mill does not consider the moral luck of individuals, condemning the poorer people to immorality simply because they cannot afford or appreciate Mill’s higher pleasures; this means that rule utilitarianism applies almost exclusively to those with the good fortune to be affluent enough to have access to higher pleasures.
American philosopher David Lyons also criticises Mill’s theory as being a different guise of act utilitarianism as it ‘collapses into act utilitarianism’ when considering the rules that may or may not apply to people. According to Lyons, because acts and consequences can be described in sufficient detail so as to find examples of desirable but unlawful acts and undesirable yet lawful actions (The forms and limits of utilitarianism, David Lyons, 1965).
As well as the aforementioned criticisms, some stock arguments against Consequentialism apply to rule utilitarianism, most notably the oversight of true goodness. G.E Moore argues that classifying goodness as happiness, we effectively reduce ‘what is good’ to ‘what is pleasurable’, making any pleasurable action seem to be good, when there is something inherently wrong about that which may be pleasurable (G. E. Moore, Principia ethica, 1903). Furthermore, Moore argues that to find pleasure in what is immoral, conversely to Mill’s theory, is an intrinsic evil as it involves attaching goodness to what is bad
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