The remaining security gap

Table of contents

1. Introduction

2. Evolution of peace operations toward multidimensional peace-building

3. The conflict in Sierra Leone and its consequences
3.1. A short historical overview:
3.2. Structure of conflict
3.3. Post-conflict situation in Sierra Leone

4. The UN response
4.1. UNAMSIL
4.1.1. The security gap
4.2. UNIOSIL and the Peace-building commission
4.2.1. UNIOSIL
4.2.2. The UN peace-building commission

5. Proposals

6. Conclusion:

Literature:

1. Introduction

As the end of the relatively clear conflict situations of the cold war era has given space for dramatic changes, we are now facing a widespread and more unpredictable security situation than some years ago.

In December 2004, the UN presented the report of the high level panel on future threats, challenges and change, concluding, that

“We cannot treat issues such as terrorism or civil wars or extreme poverty in isolation. The implications of this interconnectedness are profound. Our strategies must be comprehensive. Our institutions must overcome their narrow preoccupations and learn to work across issues in a concerted fashion.”^[1]

It has figured out six main categories of different threats, as there are: Economic and social threats (including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation), Inter-State conflict, Internal conflict (including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities), Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, Terrorism and Transnational organized crime, emphasizing their interdependence especially in the field of internal conflict.

The last two decades have seen a dramatic increase in internal conflicts and instability, forcing the United Nations to rethink its definitions of peace and security.

Peace keeping missions, often referred as intervention according to chapter 6 ½, as Dag Hammerskjöld has put it, have gradually increased, both in number and dimension.

The complexity of internal conflicts and their dramatic social, humanitarian and economic consequences for societies remain a challenge for the United Nations. Step by step, the United Nations broadened their perception, and peace operations became multidimensional interventions, including military and police components as well as NGOs and other civil actors.

As almost half of the post-conflict countries relapse into violent conflict within five years,^[2] one has to question some reasons. This paper deals mainly with the interdependent issue of security within the peace-building process, focusing on the case of Sierra Leone.

My thesis is, that, besides questions of the coordination of efforts and the gap between traditional peace keeping and peace-building, there is also a lack, concerning the short- to mid-term security of post-conflict states. Due to the bad economic position and the disturbed social structure of these post-conflict states and despite massive efforts in the economic and social sector as well as in the security sector, there is a certain period of insecurity until a state can ensure its stability both, internally and externally, on its own. This “security gap” normally appears after the withdrawal of the peacekeepers.

I have chosen the case of Sierra Leone as an example, because of its model like character of a complex internal conflict and the UN response. Furthermore, it demonstrates, that even if relatively concerted measures have been undertaken, the fragility of a post-conflict state, and therefore the unsolved question of a lack of security, remain.

One has to question, if the recent actions, set by the international community, are sufficient.

2. Evolution of peace operations toward multidimensional peace-building

Before digging into the details, one has to take a closer look on the development of the concept of peace-building. The first generation of peace operations refers to the situation of the Cold War, which fulfilled mainly the function of a buffer, “mostly limited to observing or monitoring cease-fires”^[3] , like for example UN Truce^[4] or UNEF^[5], and had therefore no peace-building component.

From a legal point of view, the beginning of UN-peace-building can be dated to the United Nations involvement in Namibia in the year 1978^[6], with the Resolution of the Security Council 435 (1978), implemented in the year 1989 framing the following relatively simple mandate to:

“…establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (…) to carry out the mandate (…) namely, to ensure (…) free elections under the supervision and control of the United nations, (…)also help the Special Representative to ensure that: all hostile acts were ended; troops were confined to base, and, in the case of the South Africans, ultimately withdrawn from Namibia; all discriminatory laws were repealed, political prisoners were released, Namibian refugees were permitted to return, intimidation of any kind was prevented, law and order were impartially maintained”^[7]

This was the first United Nations major peace-building mission,^[8] marking the beginning of various peace operations including peace building / post-conflict peace building components.

Missions like the one in Namibia highlighted the principles of . “Consent, impartiality, use of force solely for personal self-defense (…) and a statute of ferce agreement with the respective country.”^[9]

When the political environment has changed, the broader window of opportunity of the Security Council, as well as the outbreak of numerous internal conflicts has led the UN to break new ground.

From the early 1990s on, the UN has shifted from the more consensus based level towards a more proactive and multidimensional approach, no longer limited to monitoring activities, and launched missions with a broader mandate such as UNOSAL in Salvador, UNITAC in Cambodia and the UNOMOZ in Mozambique which proved to be showcases of “enlarged peacekeeping”, claiming the goal to “rebuild the capabilities of a society to resolve conflict without fighting”^[10] .

The emphasis, the UN gave to a broader definition of peace operations towards peace-building is highlighted in the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, launched in 1992. Post-conflict peace-building became an instrument of strategic importance of modern multidimensional peace operations: “The concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment (…) to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation.”^[11]

The involvement of more and more elements, including “reconstruction, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as the resettlement of refugees”^[12] , as proposed in the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace supplement, led to “multidimensional robust peace support operations” including the use of force. The Brahimi-Report in 2000 pointed in the same direction, emphasizing the importance of a “robust” doctrine especially in the context of internal, civil war like conflicts to fulfill the task of peace-building and the establishment of security.

As the task to “rebuild the capabilities of a society to resolve conflict without fighting”^[13] ,

including now almost any element of United Nations activity, the International Peace Academy points out, that "Peace-building has become a catch concept ... It is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction."^[14]

In this comparable broad field, special emphasis has been given on the issue of the security sector reform recently. This concept, holistic in its approach, highlights the importance of efficient and effective provision of state and human security “within the ambit of the consolidation of democracy, the promotion of human rights, good governance and the creation of a culture of accountability and transparency in the management of security sector processes.”^[15]

It therefore includes not only military or police force, but also non-state actors and the civil society. Special attention is given to the issues defence reform, police reform, judicial and prison reform. In the post-conflict context, special emphasis is also given on the issues of fighting the illicit trafficking of human beings, weapons and drugs, DDR,^[16] strenghtening the rule of law as well as transitional Justice.

3. The conflict in Sierra Leone and its consequences

3.1. A short historical overview:

The campaign of the RUF forces into eastern Kailahon, launched from the territory of Liberia in March 1991 marks the beginning of the civil war, which officially ended January 2002, after the establishment of the special Court of Sierra Leone.

During the war there have been two military coups in 1992 and 1996. In the run-up, the latter leading to the first free elections which Ahmad Tejan Kabbah could decide for himself and a peace agreement, which turned out to be broken only three months later.

An new military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in cooperation with the RUF was able to establish an authoritarian dictatorship. This caused the decision of the ECOWAS to intervene 1998 and re-establish the elected government, leading to the assignment of the Lomé Peace agreement on July 7, 1999. The mainly Nigerian ECOWAS contingents have been assisted by an international peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL), having a difficult start because of ongoing fighting and atrocities, but at least met its expectations from the beginning of 2001. The mandate of the UNAMSIL mission has run out 2005 and has been replaced by a new mandate of an UN observer mission (UNIOSIL) mission.

3.2. Structure of conflict

The main reasons for the outbreak of the civil war in Sierra Leone can be seen under the lights of a resource struggle due to the mismanagement of diamond and mineral resources. Corruption within the national government, combined with massive suppression of any form of opposition form the civil society, led to a complete breakdown of state structures. Poverty, as a major cause for internal conflict, was rampant.

Beside these internal factors, the civil war in the neighboring country of Liberia had a massive spill-over impact on Sierra Leone.

Firstly, due to the absence of effective national controls of borders, respectively controls within them, wide corridors opened up for trafficking arms and ammunition as well as illicit trade in general. Secondly, the weak government, its suppression on civilians and the existence of numerous small arms to serve the Liberian civil war, offered best conditions for a violent eruption of the conflict. Charles Taylor at least, president of Liberia at that time, triggered the outbreak of the civil war by sponsoring the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)^[17], to detract the ECOMOGS attention from Liberia

From the early stages on, the conflict was characterized by a massive use of violence, ensuring the RUF forces control over the diamond mines, essential as a resource base for financing further operations and worth protecting it under all circumstances, which became more ore less the only goal of the RUF.

Even though the RUF has been putting forward the slogan: "No More Slaves, No More Masters. Power and Wealth to the People.", no political or ideological claims except the overthrowing of the government can be identified, as well as there has been no ethnic justification for violence.

The resulting lack of income of the regular forces of Sierra Leone due to the collapsing of governmental structures, tempted these forces to make likewise use of pillages as well as forced recruitment.

In this connection, child soldiers became a primary pillar of any force involved during the conflict, as the cases of the RUF, the government forces, the so-called “West-Side-Boys” as well as the government related Kamajores show.^[18]

3.3. Post-conflict situation in Sierra Leone

The post-conflict situation of Sierra Leone was characterized by a widely destruction of its economy. Through the overtaking of the AFRC/RUF junta in 1997, the national treasury was empty, almost any capital stock destructed. The reinstalled government remained “mired in Sierra Leone’s culture of corruption”^[19], which resulted in a massive distrust of the majority of the population.

The deterioration of education facilities and the absence of adequate educational materials, coupled with the flight of teachers and administrative staff, resulted in fewer than 10 percent of primary age children attending school.

Because of the humanitarian disaster of the civil war, there were more than 300.000 of internally displaced persons in 2000, according to the UNHCR Global Report^[20], and many more homeless, 250.000 only in the capital of Freetown, framing a fatal security situation.

The RUF controlled almost half of the country, widespread warlord economies^[21] had established themselves, framing a fatal security situation due to the large numbers of a highly militarized population. The Sierra Leone Army was wholly dependent on foreign assistance, mainly from Britain. Civil structures, such as police, courts and other judicial frameworks etc. were completely deteriorated.

Despite the Lomé peace agreement, peace was not achieved and ongoing atrocities were rampant. The decision not to deal with past human rights violations^[22] turned out to be the wrong and did not pay off. It was therefore changed immediately in 2000 with the establishment of the Special Court, as well as with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

To make it short: Sierra Leone was at ground zero, starting its rebuilding from a very weak position.

[...]

^[1] A 59/565, 2 December 2004

^[2] www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm

^[3] Kühne, Winrich (2001): From Peacekeeping to Post-conflict Peace-building, in “Peace-building – a field guide” 2001, Lynne Rienner Publishers, page 377;

^[4] The UN Truce mission was set to monitor the ceasefire and consisted mainly of unarmed military officers (hired by UN or offered individually to the United nations) It is referred to as the first case of a United Nations Peacekeeping operation.

^[5] See also: UNEF I: http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unefi.htm

UNEF II: http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unefii.htm

^[6] Large scale atrocities of the South African government led to broad resistance movements, making further peaceful negotiations impossible. The South African government did not accept the security councils decision, and therefore the UNTAG Plan for action could not be set into place, until 1989, due to the changing of the political environment in the post cold war era.

^[7] http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untagM.htm

^[8] Paris, Roland (2004): At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict, Cambridge University Press, page 3

^[9] Ibid, page 378;

^[10] Kühne, Winrich (2001): From Peacekeeping to Post-conflict Peace-building, in “Peace-building – a field guide” 2001, Lynne Rienner Publishers, page 383;

^[11] A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992

^[12] A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995

^[13] Kühne, Winrich (2001): From Peacekeeping to Post-conflict Peace-building, in “Peace-building – a field guide” 2001, Lynne Rienner Publishers, page 383;

^[14] www.bpb.de/publikationen/P5A7KN,4,0,Die_Friedenseins%E4tze_der_VN.html

^[15] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Africa.html

^[16] Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

^[17] „Charles Taylor established an informal alliance with Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF guerrillas of Sierra Leone. (…) Taylor supplied RUF fighters with weapons, in exchange for diamonds from later rebel-controlled mines.” The transnational arm trafficking and support of RUF forces continued until the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone. See also: Stohl, Rachel/ Schroeder, Matt/ Smith, Dan (2007): “The small arms trade-a beginners guide”, One world publications, page 32

^[18] http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/themen/Kindersoldaten/afrika.html

^[19] Dobbins, James (2005): „The UN’s role in Nation-building – From Congo to Iraq“, Rand corporation, p 134;

^[20] http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3e23eb700.pdf

^[21] evakreisky.at/onlinetexte/The_Scramble_for_Sierra_Leone.pdf

^[22] RUF Leader Foday Sankoh was granted full impunity and given a official position in the new government structure that left him over the control over the diamond resources.